Consuetude in Voter Turnout

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Abstract: The extensive literature on voter turnout has devoted relatively little attention to the hypothesis that casting a ballot in one election increases one's propensity to go to the polls in the future. This hypothesis is supported by voter turnout patterns in the 1972-4-6 and 1992-4-6 American National Election Studies panel surveys as well as published experimental research. The effects of past voter turnout on current voting propensities are sizeable and robust across a wide range of model specifications, including those that take into account the possibility of stable unobserved factors affecting both past and current turnout. We conclude by discussing the implications of consuetude for political and social behavior.

Consuetude in Voter Turnout

An immense research literature examines the extent to which various individuals' demographic and social-psychological characteristics (e.g., education, partisanship) predict voter turnout (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Ashenfelter and Kelley 1975; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). No less bountiful are studies of how aggregate turnout rates vary in relation to institutional arrangements, such as registration requirements or the nature of the party system (Erikson 1981; Highton 1997; Highton and Wolfinger 1998; Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978). Yet, within this abundant literature one finds relatively little attention to what might be called *consuetude* in voting.

Consuetude is conventionally defined as *habit* or *custom* but lacks the unwanted connotations of those terms. The term habit calls to mind such activities as cigaret smoking or drug addiction, in which a person is locked into a pattern of conduct by forces that are in some sense outside his or her control.[1] Similarly, to call voting a customary activity directs more attention than we would like to the effects of the cultural context in which voting occurs. Absent from common parlance, *consuetude* provides an empty vessel into which we may pour the following meaning: An act may be said to be the source of consuetude if, other things presently being equal, merely engaging in the activity today makes it more likely that one will engage in the same activity in the future.

In the context of voter turnout, the concept of consuetude implies that if two people whose psychological propensities to vote are identical should happen to make different choices about whether

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[1]Also unsuitable is the concept of rational addiction (Becker and Murphy 1988), which focuses on the trade-offs between current and future consumption given that past drug use enhances the desire for present consumption but increases the quantity of drugs needed to achieve the same physiological reaction. It is not clear that such intertemporal choices apply to the case of voter turnout.

to go to the polls on election day, these behaviors will alter their likelihoods of voting in the next election. In other words, holding pre-existing individual and environmental attributes constant, merely going to the polls increases one's chance of returning. The *ceteris paribus* clause is important, because we are not merely claiming that individual differences in voting propensity persist over time. That much is obvious from simple cross-tabulations of voting behavior among respondents in panel studies. Rather, our point is that the propensity to vote changes when one votes.

To state the point more formally, suppose voter turnout to be a function of two groups of causative factors. Let P represent all of the personal characteristics that impel a person to vote in a given situation. These characteristics include social-psychological attributes such as feelings of civic duty, sense of personal efficacy, partisan attachments, interest in politics, and the like. Let S represent the myriad of situational factors that affect what may be broadly construed as the costs and benefits of voting. These factors range from the convenience of one's polling location to the blandishments of ward captains to the ways in which voting is looked upon by one's peers. We wish to focus on the effects of P' and S', those personal or situational characteristics that are not themselves the products of past voting or nonvoting. If we denote voting in an election at time *t* as $V_t=1$ and nonvoting as $V_t=0$, then consuetude in voting may be characterized as

$$V_t = 1 \text{ if } f(P'_t, S'_t, V_{t-1}) > 0$$

$$\text{and}$$

$$V_t = 0 \text{ otherwise.}$$

Our hypothesis is that voting in the previous election matters, controlling for enduring personal and situational factors. Lure someone to the voting booth, and you will raise his or her propensity to vote in a future election. This hypothesis is consistent with findings suggesting that political participation leaves a psychological imprint on those who act (Finkel 1985; Nownes 1992).

2

Before taking up the question of why going to the polls (or failing to do so) might be a matter of consuetude, we must first establish empirically that it is so. Scholars such as Brody and Sniderman (1977, pp. 347-8) have reported that past voting behavior predicts current turnout, controlling for a host of individual-level traits, such as age, race, income, education, sex, and psychological involvement in politics. This kind of regression analysis, however, leaves open the possibility of "unobserved heterogeneity" among individuals; that is, unobserved factors that caused past voting behavior might also cause current turnout. Although we agree with Brody and Sniderman's conclusion that "Voting is for many a habit" (p.349), we are concerned about the persuasiveness of the test that they propose.

One objective of this essay is to estimate in a more robust fashion the effects of past voting on current behavior. This undertaking requires special attention to methodological nuance, because we must ensure that individuals' varying propensities to vote do not distort our inferences. We propose an instrumental variables method to address this concern and apply it to the 1972-6 and 1992-6 American National Election Study Panel Surveys. This exercise garners considerable support for the notion that voting behavior, in itself, alters subsequent voting proclivities. Moreover, the estimates we obtain coincide with our reanalysis of field experiments in which registered voters were contacted at random and their voting behavior tracked over a sequence of subsequent elections (Kraut and McConahay 1973; Yalch 1976). We conclude by offering some explanations for why a causal link might exist between past and present behavior. In an effort to lay the groundwork for subsequent research in this area, we describe some of the far-reaching empirical implications of consuetude in political and social behavior.

Estimation Amid Problems of Unobserved Heterogeneity

To gauge the effects of past behavior on current behavior using nonexperimental data, one tracks a set of individuals across successive elections, charting their personal and contextual characteristics along the way. Panel studies of this sort are rather rare, but two studies in particular, the

1972-4-6 and 1992-4-6 American National Election Study Panels, provide a wealth of information about respondents' social psychological profiles and their exposure to campaign influences in successive presidential elections.

Even with such data in hand, estimating a model of the sort depicted in eq. (1) present some serious hazards. As Nownes (1992, p.210) cautions, lagged voter turnout is a problematic indicator of habit. Despite a concerted effort to control for a wide array of personal or situational determinants of voting, unobserved influences on turnout may remain. To the extent that these influences persist over time, the analyst runs the risk of finding a consuetude effect where none exists. Voter turnout in one election may be a significant predictor of turnout in the next simply because factors absent from our model affect turnout in both elections.

The severity of this bias is impossible to determine exactly. Even if we incorporate every available control variable in an effort to eliminate all enduring differences among individuals, we can never rule out the possibility that some unmeasured variable accounts for over-time persistence in voting behavior. For this reason, it makes more sense to focus on the robustness of the estimates across a range of plausible models and estimation techniques than to chase after sort of comprehensive model of turnout that would be free from bias. If it can be shown that consuetude effects turn up across a wide array of different modeling assumptions, we would infer a causal link between past and present behavior. This inference would be strengthened further if these results could be corroborated by experimental evidence.

In the interests of minimizing susceptibility to bias and of establishing the robustness of our results, we present an array of alternative models. The first group of models is recursive. These models use observed voter turnout in a previous election as a predictor, with no special statistical correction for spuriousness in the relationship between lagged and current turnout. We do, however, include as controls as many regressors as are available in the American National Election Study

surveys. For example, when predicting voter turnout in 1976, we control for evaluations of the candidates and their platforms, the perceived closeness of the contest in the respondent's state, campaign contacts, political interest, organizational involvement, civic duty, interpersonal trust, residential mobility, whether the respondent experienced transportation or weather difficulties, registration requirements in the respondent's state, education, region, and other demographic characteristics. This list of control variables is somewhat more extensive than that employed by Brody and Sniderman (1977), but on the whole the analysis is similar.

Although this inventory of controls is extensive, some uncertainty surrounds the issue of when to measure these background characteristics. One possibility is to predict voter turnout in, for example, 1976 using turnout in 1972 and 1974 and a bevy of control variables measured in 1976. This might be termed a 'proximal' specification. Another is to measure the control variables as they existed in 1972 and 1974 (an 'intermediate' specification) or just as they existed in 1972 (a 'distal' specification). The more recently measured the control variables, the more likely they are to screen out sources of spurious correlation. On the other hand, more recent controls may also mediate the effects of past voting. If, for example, voting in 1972 enhances one's sense of civic duty in 1976, controlling for civic duty in 1976 will obscure this indirect effect. Thus, when we control for social-psychological correlates of voting in 1976, we are putting the consuetude hypothesis to a demanding test.

The second group of estimates are derived from nonrecursive models. In an effort to prevent biases stemming from over-time correlation among unobserved causes of turnout, we use regressors drawn from the 1972 survey (X_{72}) as instruments for voter turnout in 1972 (V_{72}) and likewise for 1974. This list of instrumental variables corresponds to the regressors drawn from the 1976 study (e.g., campaign contacts, political interest, etc.). These 1976 control variables (X_{76}) are assumed to affect the vote in 1976 directly. Formally, this model may be written

$$Pr[V_{72}=1] = \Phi[X_{72}B_{72}]$$

$$Pr[V_{74}{=}1]{=}\Phi[X_{74}B_{74}]$$

$$Pr[V_{76}{=}1]{=}\Phi[X_{76}B_{76}{+}\Gamma_{72}\Phi[X_{72}b_{72}]{+}\Gamma_{74}\Phi[X_{74}b_{74}]].$$

Here b_{72} denotes the first-stage probit estimates of B_{72}, b_{74} denotes the first-stage probit estimates of B_{74}, and $\Phi[.]$ refers to the cumulative normal density function.

The model is identified because some aspects of the presidential contest — e.g., the closeness of the election, the ideological gap between the candidates — vary from one election cycle to the next. Thus, X_{72} and X_{74} will be distinct from X_{76}, and since X_{72} and X_{74} presumably have no direct effect on voter turnout in 1976 controlling for X_{76}, the key coefficients, Γ_{72} and Γ_{74} may be estimated consistently. In sum, our procedure is to use probit to regress voter turnout in 1976 on the predicted probability of voting in 1972 and 1974, controlling for all the available independent variables from 1976. An analogous method is used to analyze voter turnout in the 1992-96 panel.

The details of how the independent variables were coded are summarized in the appendix. Two comments regarding the dependent variable warrant mention. The first concerns estimation. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, voter turnout in 1976 is analyzed using probit. For the recursive models,

$$Pr[V_{76}{=}1]{=}\Phi[\rho_{72}V_{72}{+}\rho_{74}V_{74}{+}X_{72}B_{72}{+}X_{74}B_{74}{+}X_{76}B_{76}],$$

with more or fewer control variables depending on the specification. The nonrecursive models apply

two-stage probit to the equations described above. In the first stage, probit is used to generate

predicted turnout in 1972 and 1974, using the range of regressors derived from the 1972 and 1974

surveys. These predicted values are then used as regressors in a second probit equation, which

controls for the welter of control variables measured in 1976. The resulting standard errors are then

adjusted to reflect the two-step procedure (Shachar 1994; see also Heckman 1981 for a related

approach).

Like all analysts of voter turnout, we are bedeviled by the ongoing debate about whether to use

reported or actual vote. In 1972-74-76, the ANES endeavored to document voter turnout by

reference to official documents. No such effort was undertaken in 1992-96. It turns out, however, that

the choice of one measure over the other has little effect on the estimates we obtain, a finding that

squares with some other studies that find relatively small differences between analyses of validated and

reported vote (Hill and Hurley 1984; but see Presser and Traugott 1992). Reported visits to the polls

are about as autocorrelated as actual visits.

By the same token, we were careful to avoid artifacts arising from voter registration

procedures. Although this model controls for varying registration requirements across states, it does

not deal directly with the fact that in some areas voters who fail to go to the polls are subsequently

dropped from the registration rolls. The persistence of turnout or abstention over time could actually be

due to the way in which registration lists are expunged. In order to guard against this problem, we

restricted the analyses to respondents who were registered to vote in 1976 and 1996, respectively.[2]

The findings presented in Table 1 suggest that turnout in a given presidential election is a

powerful determinant of turnout in the subsequent presidential contest. Looking first at the recursive

1972-76 results, most of the probit coefficients fall in the range between .90 and 1.10. Although the

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[2]Estimates based on the registered electorate, reassuringly, do not much differ from the
earlier results based on the electorate as a whole.

estimates fluctuate somewhat, there is a remarkable degree of agreement across specifications and panel studies. In every specification, the two lagged turnout regressors are correctly signed and jointly significant at the .05 level.

Moreover, the effect sizes are substantively quite large. To get a sense of what the probit coefficients mean in terms of probabilities, consider hypothetical voters who have a 50% probability of going to the polls on election day. Using the median probit coefficient of .93 for purposes of illustration, we calculate that if these voters vote in a given election, their probability of voting in the next climbs from 50% to 82%. Put somewhat differently, if everyone in the 1976 panel had voted in 1972, the overall turnout rate for this sample in 1976 would have been 83%. Conversely, if no one in our sample had voted in 1972, the turnout rate for 1976 would have been 56%.

Similar results obtain using when these parameters are applied to the 1992-4-6 panel study. The coefficients fluctuate across specifications, but in each case lagged votes are jointly significant at the .05 level. The median probit estimate is 1.00, which again translates into sharply altered probabilities. Persons whose background characteristics would otherwise predict a 16% rate of voter turnout will go to polls at a rate of 50% if they voted in one of the two preceding national elections.

[insert Table 1 about here]

Much the same findings surface when nonrecursive estimation techniques are used. If anything, the effect sizes are larger, which may reflect either the increased sampling variability associated two-stage probit estimates or the fact that this nonrecursive model purges past voting behavior of measurement error (cf. Hanushek and Jackson 1977, p.269). One way or the other, it does not appear that the effects of lagged voter turnout are due simply to unobserved factors that affect both lagged and current voter turnout.[3] Indeed, in analyses not reported in Table 1 but available on request

from the authors, we experimented with a range of different choices of instrumental variables. In every case, nonrecursive estimation approaches produced probit coefficients equal or greater in size than those we report here. If the link between lagged and current voting is artifactual, it is an unusually tenacious artifact.

Nonrecursive estimates suggest a possible nuance in the relationship between past and current behavior. The last rows of Table 1 indicate that past voting in presidential elections had a greater impact than past voting in midterm elections. This finding suggests that the formation or erosion of voting habits may be specific to the kinds of elections in question. Compared to turnout in midterm elections, voting in presidential elections may be more conducive to subsequent presidential voting. As we will see, this pattern is suggested as well by the small experimental literature that tracks voting across a sequence of elections.

Experimental Findings

The nonexperimental evidence at the individual and aggregate levels suggests that the act of voting in one presidential election increases the likelihood that one will vote in the next election. Although this effect has been shown to be quite robust across different modeling assumptions, an irreducible residuum of doubt remains in any nonexperimental test. For this reason, it is important to crossvalidate these results using experimental data.

Two studies that track voters across successive elections are Kraut and McConahay (1973) and Yalch (1976).[4] Both studies randomly assigned lists of registered voters to treatment and control

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[3]One finding that attests to the robustness of models that correct for unobserved heterogeneity is the fact that we obtain similar two-stage probit coefficients for lagged vote regardless of whether education measures are included in the model.

[4]Although the classic get-out-the-vote experiments of Gosnell (1927) and Eldersveld (1956) each examined more than one election, they stimulated turnout before each election, making it

conditions prior to an election at time$_1$. Subjects in the treatment condition were contacted as part of a get-out-the-vote drive; different contacts or none at all occurred in the control condition. For our purposes, the dependent variable is voter turnout not in the current election (time$_1$), but in the election to follow (time$_2$). (In effect, random assignment to treatment and control conditions becomes the instrumental variable with which to assess the effect of turnout at time$_1$ on turnout at time$_2$.) If voting today increases one's proclivity to vote in the future, then treatment and control conditions should vote at different rates in subsequent elections.

This pattern in borne out in Kraut and McConahay's (1973) study of Italian-Americans living in New Haven. Respondents (n=104) were randomly assigned to treatment and control conditions. Those in the treatment condition were interviewed in person approximately two weeks prior to a 1970 Democratic primary election in May. Voting rates were tabulated for both the May primary and a Democratic primary in August. For both elections, Kraut and McConahay (p.402) found turnout to be significantly higher in the treatment condition. In May, turnout rates for treatment and control groups were 48% and 21%, respectively; In August, these rates were 50% and 31%. Applying our two-stage probit model to these data yields a coefficient of 1.87 with a standard error of .93, a result that is remarkably similar to what we obtained using nonexperimental data.

Yalch's (1976) study of aldermanic elections in Chicago in 1973 attests to the strengths and limitations of the consuetude hypothesis. Yalch conducted personal interviews with respondents in the treatment condition prior to the June, 1973 special local election and tabulated turnout rates in that election, a July run-off election, and the March, 1974 primary election. The effects of the treatment are powerful not only for the June election, but for the July run-off as well. A second treatment group that was interviewed in July had a higher rate of turnout in the run-off election than the group that was interviewed in June (75% vs. 69%), but this difference is not significant at the .05 level using a one-tailed test. Turnout in the national primary of 1974 saw both treatment groups return to rates close to

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impossible to judge whether enduring habits were established.

that of the district as a whole.[5] Yalch interprets this as evidence that habits failed to take root, but another possibility is that voting in aldermanic elections does not create habits of voting in statewide and national primary elections. The latter interpretation is consistent with our nonexperimental findings suggesting that voting in presidential elections is more strongly influenced by past voting in presidential contests than by past voting in midterm elections. Additional experimentation is needed to adjudicate between these competing possibilities.

Why Consuetude?

Suppose for the purposes of argument that the effects of past voting behavior are genuine: voting in a one national election indeed affects the probability that one will vote in the next.[6] What causative processes might underlie this effect? At least three explanations present themselves.

The first hypothesis concerns the ways in which the political environment responds to one's level of political participation. Voters receive much more attention from parties, candidates, and issue activists than do nonvoters. When a registered voter fails to go to the polls, he or she becomes less likely to attract the attention of the campaign, whether through direct mail, phone calls, or canvassing. Voting is self-reinforcing, by this account, because parties and interest groups have an incentive to focus their attention on active voters.

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[5]Yalch's tabulation of the data (p.335) makes precise comparisons problematic. Due to missing turnout data, the table compares somewhat different groups of voters over time. Even more problematic is that Yalch seems to have used different number of eligible voters when computing district-wide turnout rates, a fact that causes him to underestimate the enduring effects of his stimulus.

[6]The consuetude hypothesis has implications for aggregate rates of voter turnout. A surge in turnout in one presidential election should lead to above average rates of turnout in the next presidential race. This pattern of autocorrelation in marked in US presidential elections when the results are broken down by state for the period 1948-1996. These results are available on request from the authors.

The force of this argument is undermined, however, by the fact that the models presented in Table 1 control for "campaign contacts" and political discussion in each election. If voters in fact receive special attention, the direct effect of lagged turnout should evaporate once these contextual factors are controlled. Even if one grants that campaign contacts and political discussion are measured unreliably, it is difficult to attribute effects of this magnitude to political mobilization, particularly when they are corroborated by experimental studies.[7]

A second hypothesis concerns the psychological repercussions of turnout or abstention. Suppose it were the case that turnout alters certain broad political orientations known to influence voter turnout, such as the voter's sense of "internal efficacy," feelings of civic duty, level of partisanship, or interest in politics. This kind of argument is consistent with Finkel's (1985) finding that political participation alters one's sense of political efficacy. Without disputing Finkel's results or the notion that these political orientations might change in the wake of political participation, we find this explanation wanting as an account of the effects we report here. Our models show an effect of lagged turnout even after controlling for these political orientations during the current election. Indeed, we attempted to control for *all* of the key psychological orientations measured by the American National Election Study surveys. Unless we posit serious deficiencies in the ways these traits are measured — so serious that even the complete set of control variables culled from the 1972, 1974, and 1976 surveys (see Table 1) fails to gauge the traits reliably — endogeneity among the orientations commonly measured by the NES is not a persuasive explanation.

The third class of explanations, accordingly, comprises psychological orientations that have not been measured in NES surveys. Borrowing the terminology of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), we note that the NES surveys lack questions measuring "conative attitudes" toward voting, that is, positive or

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[7]It may be possible to attribute some of the persistence in voting patterns to the fact that voter turnout is misreported in similar ways over time (Presser and Traugott 1992). However, we do not find any appreciable differences in results when using validated vote for 1972-4-6.

negative feelings about engaging in the act of voting itself. The registered nonvoter may regard going to the polls with a certain amount of apprehensiveness. Will I know how to work the voting machine? Will the poll workers treat me respectfully? Will I know where to go and which line to stand in? Like internal efficacy, this orientation concerns one's self-confidence in a political environment, but it does so with a much higher degree of specificity. Internal efficacy is typically operationalized and measured with items like "politics is too complicated for me to understand," whereas conative attitudes toward voting address the issue of whether the image conjured up by the prospect of voting is attractive or aversive.

Consuetude, by this rendering, is a matter of growing comfortable with a given form of action. Experienced voters glide through the act of voting and may even come to regard it as enjoyable. Inexperienced voters are more likely to feel awkward, or at least to imagine feelings of awkwardness as they envision themselves going to the polls. Certainly, the notion that repetition breeds familiarity describes a wide range of human behaviors, ranging from musical to ritual to sexual performance. Whether it accounts for consuetude in voting remains an open empirical question, one that presumably will be addressed as social scientists track the consequences of policies that have made voting easier in states like Texas.

A related hypothesis points to the role of self-conceptions, another psychological dimension that goes unmeasured in most voting studies. Acts of civic piety may subtly alter the way that citizens look at themselves. Going to the polls confirms and reinforces one's self-image as a civic-minded, politically involved citizen. The more one votes, the more one comes to regard going to the polls as 'what people like me do on election day.' Conversely, abstention weakens this self-conception and the feelings of obligation that grow out of it. In this respect, abstention desensitizes in much the same way that violations of social norms in general reduce inhibitions about subsequent norm violations (Tyler 1990). Again, although the NES and other panel surveys occasionally ask respondents whether citizens in general have an obligation to vote, they do not ask whether the respondent feels such an obligation or thinks of him/herself as someone who makes a point of going to the polls on election day.

It is not hard to understand why conventional surveys do not ask such questions. Typically, social scientists concern themselves with more distal explanations of turnout. Mediating factors such as conative attitudes or feelings of personal obligation as so proximal to the act of voting that they do not hold much interest as explanations. Moreover, they are difficult to mold into usable survey questions, given social pressures that encourage respondents to give civic-minded answers. These practical difficulties aside, our competing hypotheses are testable within the context of the experiment described earlier. If conative attitudes are the key mediators, we would predict that respondents in the treatment condition would be less likely to express apprehensiveness about the process of casting a vote. If self-conceptions are at work, those in the treatment condition should henceforth become more likely to select nouns like "voter" as self-descriptors.

Consuetude in Politics and Social Life

We have speculated at some length about the role and nature of consuetude in voting, speculation that might be extended to other important forms of human behavior. Is it coincidental that behavior-bred attitudes should figure prominently in religious and organizational doctrine? From the Jewish moral dictum that 'the hand teaches the heart' to the Alcoholics Anonymous slogan 'bring your body and your mind will follow,' one encounters again and again the view that action begets commitment. Such ideas about participation in charitable or self-help activities are in some sense at the core of dissonance-reduction theories in psychology. Encourage someone to participate in a given form of behavior — buying a new brand, collaborating with others on a group project, performing a religious rite — and their attitudes will shift to conform with this action. Actions create tastes and beliefs that encourage subsequent action.

Whether for behaviors such as church attendance, exercise, or recycling this hypothesis is more than wishful thinking remains an open empirical question. As we noted at the outset, behaviors may be correlated over time for reasons having nothing to do with the causative force of past conduct. The

14

hand may seem to teach the heart, but it could be an illusion of adverse selection whereby the more charitable behave more charitably. To date, most scholars who use 'habit' to describe behavioral persistence in everything from tax compliance (Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde 1986) to automobile use (Verplanken, et al. 1998) have been agnostic on the question of whether, as Lester Milbrath (1965, p. 7) speculated, political participation is self-reinforcing.

If consuetude is a real phenomenon, however, the implications are quite far-reaching. With respect to voter turnout, it could be argued that the postwar decline in turnout in the United States is the result of a gradual erosion of voting as a habitual activity, a trend that could be reversed if voting days were made official holidays or moved to weekends, if more resources were devoted to nonpartisan get-out-the-vote efforts, or if registration requirements were relaxed. Indeed, extending the argument to political participation more generally, could it be that the minimal level of public engagement in politics is less an inherent manifestation of collective action dilemmas (Downs 1957) than an historical by-product of efforts decades ago to discourage mass mobilization (Piven and Cloward 1988)? This essay has sought to draw attention to the apparent force of habit in civic participation, suggesting a number of theoretical and policy implications that flow from the notion that behavior alters behavioral propensities. Our aim is to stimulate further investigation of the consuetude effect, research that may not only corroborate its existence but also explain the mechanisms through which it operates.

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Table 1
Relationship between Past and Current Voter Turnout under Different Modeling Assumptions
(entries are probit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses)

	Turnout 1972	Turnout 1974	Turnout 1992	Turnout 1994
Recursive Estimation				
Observed Vote as Predictors, No controls	.93 (.11)	1.06 (.10)	.54 (.20)	1.00 (.16)
Observed Vote as Predictors, Controls for 1972/92 Variables	.76 (.12)	.93 (.11)	.54 (.27)	1.05 (.22)
Observed Vote as Predictors, Controls for 1972/92 & 1974/94 Variables	.80 (.12)	.94 (.11)	1.16 (.36)	1.06 (.30)
Observed Vote as Predictors, Controls for 1972/92, 1974/94/ & 1976/96	.93 (.13)	.99 (.13)	1.19 (.54)	1.66 (.56)
Nonrecursive Estimation				
Predicted (2nd Stage) Vote as Predictors, No controls	1.77 (.10)	1.55 (.10)	1.55 (.46)	1.85 (.47)
Predicted (2nd Stage) Vote as Predictors, Controls for 1976/1996 Variables	1.56 (.12)	.69 (.12)	2.70 (.38)	0.52 (.27)
N of cases	991		360	

Note: Other coefficients in each model are excluded to conserve space. These variables are listed in the appendix, and the complete results are available from the authors on request.